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Past colonialism has shaped current policies and patterns relating to sugar trade. To examine the 
effects of historical colonial linkages on sugar trade, the gravity model is estimated for a panel of 
raw sugar imports into 25 OECD countries from the rest of the world over the 1961-2016 period. 
Colonial linkages in a North-South direction increase sugar trade, but colonial linkages in a 
North-North direction decrease it. Several distinct North-South colonial channels are identified. 
Sugar trade is enhanced by the major empire shipping routes, rail infrastructure, cultural 
proximity and preferential market access.  
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Sugar Trade and the Role of Historical Colonial Linkages 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The origins of modern global trade are founded in sugar. First encountered by the Europeans in 
the 15th century, sugar later became a staple good as the Age of Discovery and foreign 
dominance opened up trading routes and paved the way for the shipment of sugar back to the 
homeland. Indeed, colonial settlement and expansion often began with the seizure of lands for 
the purpose of producing sugar; cane plantations and the processing of sugar generated much 
wealth for Europeans (Mahler 1981; Parker 2012). The sweetness of sugar, however, belies a 
bitter history of a commodity harvested by slaves, as Africans were sold to white traders replaced 
Europeans in the plantations. Triangular trade – involving the exchange of goods for slaves 
between Europe and West Africa and the sale of slaves to transatlantic plantation owners in 
return for sugar (and, to a lesser extent, other plantation products such as coffee and tobacco) – 
helped drive the first wave of economic globalisation (Harms 2003). During the 18th century, 
sugar cane grown in the Caribbean and harvested by African slaves provided Britain with most 
of its sugar needs. Nevertheless, a twenty-year campaign to abolish slavery succeeded when a 
bill before Parliament was passed in 1807.1 
Perhaps more than any other commodity, past colonialism has shaped current policies 
and patterns relating to sugar trade. The emergence of the sugar beet industry in Europe during 
the 19th century was encouraged by rebellion in the colonies and the disruption of sugar supplies 
(Mitchell 2004). Unable to compete with lower-cost sugar produced from cane in tropical 
                                                 
1 Slavery had already been temporarily suspended in France in 1794, was banned in Denmark in 1803 and had been 
prohibited in several northern American states before 1807. 
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countries, many northern hemisphere countries subsidised the production of beet – a policy later 
adopted by the European Union (EU) as part of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). During 
the 20th century, the production of sugar cane grown in tropical climates recovered. In particular 
from the 1960s, a plethora of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have granted non-reciprocal, 
preferential treatment to many former colonies. Currently, sugar cane cultivated in the southern 
hemisphere accounts for about three-quarters of all sugar produced, while the rest comes mainly 
from sugar beet grown in the more temperate climates of the northern hemisphere. This is not 
surprising, as sugar cane production enjoys a cost advantage of roughly half the average cost of 
sugar beet production (Mitchell 2004). 
The top-10 net-importing and net-exporting countries of raw sugar are shown in Figures 
1 and 2 respectively. Several features of the data are noteworthy. First, the EU member 
countries, the United States and Japan are among the largest net importers of raw sugar. These 
countries are also among the worst offenders of distortionary sugar policies (Mitchell 2004). 
Second, by far the largest net exporter of raw sugar is Brazil – also the world’s largest producer – 
quadrupling the tonnage exported by Australia, the second largest net exporter of raw sugar. 
Third, Latin American countries (Brazil, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and Nicaragua) 
dominate the top-10 net exporters of raw sugar. Sub-Saharan Africa is represented by two 
countries (Mozambique and Swaziland) while Asia and Oceania are represented by one country 
each (Thailand and Australia respectively, the latter being the only advanced country among the 
ten). Interestingly, only three of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries that have 
received preferential access to the EU market feature among the top-ten net exporting countries 
(Cuba, Mozambique and Swaziland). Last, except for Thailand, all other top-10 net exporters of 
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raw sugar have colonial linkages with European countries (see Appendix: Table A1). In other 
words, the data suggest current patterns of raw sugar trade reflect a colonial past. 
Figure 1  Top-10 net importing countries of raw sugar as at 2015 (million tonnes) 
 
Source: International Sugar Organisation.  
 
Figure 2  Top-10 net exporting countries of raw sugar as at 2015 (million tonnes) 
 
Source: International Sugar Organisation.  
 
Only a few studies have emphasised the importance of a colonial history on patterns of 
trade. For historical epochs ranging from 1870 to 1939, Estevadeordal et al. (2003) and 
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) assess the role of empires in explaining trade patterns. Using 
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inter-war and post-war data (1928-1938 and 1949-1964 respectively), Eichengreen and Irwin 
(1998) include the lag of trade to capture the effect of historical events – past colonialism, 
migration and currency areas. More recently, Tomz et al. (2007) take account of colonial trade 
preferences in analysing the effect of international institutions on trade. In a similar vein, 
Francois and Manchin (2013) examine the trade effects of institutional and infrastructure quality, 
trade preferences as well as the colonial and geographic context. The effect of decolonisation on 
trade has also been examined, for example, by Head et al. (2010) who study the effect of 
independence on post-colonial trade. At a regional level, Brodzicki and Uminski (2017) analyse 
trade persistence and the role of the metropolitan regions. At a disaggregated level, studies 
quantifying the effect of a common colonial heritage on trade include Vollrath et al.’s (2009) 
analysis of the agricultural, manufactured food and clothing sectors; Raimondi and Olper’s 
(2011) study of 18 food sectors; and Sun and Reed’s (2010) analysis of agricultural trade 
creation and diversion effects of free trade agreements. 
In assessing the effect of a common colonial history on recent patterns of sugar trade, the 
contributions offered here are three-fold. First, a distinction is made between the effects on raw 
sugar trade of colonial ties with the global south (North-South linkages) and the global north 
(North-North linkages). Second, the channels through which the effects of North-South colonial 
linkages have endured over time are identified, namely technological innovations in 
infrastructure relating to the major empire shipping routes and rail lines; cultural proximity; and 
trade policies of both a preferential and a protectionist nature. Finally, the implications of recent 
policy reforms in terms of EU preferential schemes are examined. 
The findings of the disaggregated analysis suggest a common colonial relationship has 
opposite effects depending on its direction; the import of raw sugar is enhanced if historical 
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linkages follow a North-South direction, but is suppressed by common linkages in a North-North 
direction. The non-uniform effect of sharing a common colonial past likely depends on the 
source of raw sugar: low-cost sugar cane originating mainly in the tropical and sub-tropical 
southern hemisphere versus high-cost sugar beet grown mainly in the temperate northern 
hemisphere. Furthermore, the effects of North-South historical colonial linkages on raw sugar 
trade are found to operate through several channels. Atlantic trading routes carved out by the 
major empires, together with rail infrastructure, significantly increase raw sugar trade. The effect 
of cultural proximity depends on whether the common language is spoken by a minority or 
majority of a country’s population. Trade policy has mixed effects; the import of raw sugar trade 
is enhanced by preferential treatment and is reduced by protectionist policy in the form of tariffs, 
albeit not significantly in tandem with the phasing out of tariffs in the post-reform period. 
Finally, EU preferential market access granted to 19 ACP Sugar Protocol countries over the pre-
reform period covering the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement is found to raise 
trade significantly and substantially. For the post-reform period, an insignificant trade effect is 
obtained for developing countries that qualify under the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative, 
while the recent formation (and ongoing negotiation) of regional economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs) has yet to have an effect on raw sugar trade.  
The remainder of the article is laid out as follows. Section 2 presents the gravity model 
specification of bilateral trade in raw sugar and the estimation strategy. A description of the data 
and sources are provided in Section 3. The empirical findings in Section 4 are split between the 
gravity model results, robustness checks and the main channels through which North-South 
colonial linkages affect trade patterns. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION  
2.1 The Gravity Model 
To examine the effects of historical colonial linkages on sugar trade, the gravity model 
specification is as follows: 
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t
j
t
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t
ij DISTGDPGDPIMPORTS lnlnlnexp( 321    
                       tijijijjij COLNSCOLNNLOCKADJ   7654  
    (1) 
 
where tijIMPORTS  refer to the bilateral import of raw sugar into 25 member countries of the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, countries i ) from the rest of 
the world (countries j ) over the 1961-2016 time period t . The gravity variables include the 
natural logarithm ( ln ) of GDP for both countries to denote economic size, and the log of 
geographic distance as a proxy for transport costs. Four dummy variables are included, two to 
capture geographical characteristics (adjoining land borders and landlocked countries), with 
historical colonial linkages between countries split in two different directions (North-North and 
North-South). The random error term is denoted by tij . A summary of the gravity model 
variable definitions and data sources is provided in the Appendix (Table A2). 
Anderson (1979) was the first to provide theoretical underpinnings for the gravity model 
using the properties of the expenditure equation of tradable goods, whereby the origin country’s 
GDP is a proxy for the production of traded goods, and the destination country’s GDP is a proxy 
for expenditure on traded goods. The derived gravity model also captured transport costs, hence 
GDP and distance, ijDIST , should be positively and negatively signed respectively. 
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Closer ties between two countries – whether geographical, historical, cultural, political, 
legal or otherwise – tend to increase trade. An adjoining land border, ijADJ , can expand trade 
with neighbouring countries mainly because lower costs facilitate cross border transactions. On 
the other hand, as overland transport costs tend to be higher than shipping costs, landlocked 
countries, jLOCK , are disadvantaged in trade terms because of their geographical position. 
Of particular interest is the trade effect of sharing a common colonial past, split between 
North-North and North-South colonial dummies, ijCOLNN  and ijCOLNS  (see Appendix: Table 
A1). A shared colonial history may well boost current economic linkages, usually because past 
colonisation of another country means that the coloniser has contributed to the colony’s state of 
institutions – and the language of those institutions. In the case of raw sugar, the effect of 
colonialism is qualified by its direction. Low-cost producers of sugar cane in tropical countries 
have long since had a cost advantage over producers of sugar beet in the advanced countries. As 
sugar consumption evolved from a scarce luxury to a daily necessity, the rich world sought to 
forge links – often by force – with the developing world. Indeed, much of the foreign land seized 
under colonial rule was used in the production of raw sugar cane, exploited for trade and wealth 
gains (see, inter alia, Mintz 1985). More recently, northern countries have granted trade 
preferences to selected southern countries, thereby enhancing their relative cost-competitiveness. 
Consequently, a positive sign is expected for the North-South dummy. In contrast, an expected 
negative sign for the North-North dummy is aligned with the protected higher-cost beet 
industries in the northern hemisphere.  
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2.2 Estimation Strategy 
As trade costs can differ depending on location, three main approaches have been 
adopted in the literature. First, cross-country variation in trade costs can be proxied by 
international differences in aggregate price indexes, for example, an exchange rate index, an 
export unit value index or the GDP deflator (Bergstrand 1989). This approach, however, entails a 
degree of arbitrary selection of price indexes, without necessarily eliminating the omitted 
variable bias problem. Second, to account for all those factors which impede bilateral trade, 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) compute multilateral price terms capturing bilateral trade 
costs relative to all other trading partner countries. Modifying model (1) to allow for multilateral 
trade-resisting variables, the gravity model can be expressed as follows:  
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where the aggregate price indexes are replaced with price terms for the exporting and the 
importing countries, 1iP and 
1
jP  (the multilateral resistance terms); and   is the elasticity of 
substitution between all goods. 
Last, Feenstra (2002) advocates the use of country fixed effects in preference to calculating 
complex price terms. As trade costs are often not directly observable or are difficult to measure, 
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this approach has the advantage of generating unbiased coefficient estimates in the presence of 
measurement problems. Model (2) can thus be restated:  
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where the price terms are now represented by fixed effects for the exporting and the importing 
countries, i  and j , respectively. With the additional dimensions of panel datasets, solving the 
omitted variable bias problem has emerged in the form of how to control correctly for 
heterogeneity across countries (Baltagi et al. 2003; Baldwin and Taglioni 2006; Stack 2009). 
Specifically, the generalised gravity model for a panel (with both cross-sectional and time 
dimensions) should allow for time-invariant country-pair dummies to capture the omission of 
bilateral trade determinants, as well as time-varying country dummies to capture the variation of 
multilateral resistance over time (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006).  
The generalised gravity model specification, however, is problematic for estimating the 
determinants of sugar in so far as the time-invariant variables (including the colonial dummies) 
are subsumed into the country-pair dummies and hence cannot be estimated directly. Moreover, 
in noting that the generalised version of the gravity equation cannot explain patterns of zero trade 
flows, Helpman et al. (2008) develop an estimation procedure that uses information relating to 
both trading and non-trading countries. They argue that gravity model studies of countries with 
positive trade flows only – and omitting countries that do not trade with each other (ie zero 
bilateral trade flows) – can lead to biased results.   
Estimating the log-linear gravity model in the presence of zeros – a common issue in 
disaggregated data – is problematic because the logarithm of zero is undefined. Haq et al. (2013) 
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outline several ways in which the issue of zeros has been dealt with. Zero trade flows have been 
dropped or replaced with small positive numbers, but the results are potentially biased. More 
often, one of three approaches have been used: Tobit regression with the zero observations 
censored; Heckman’s (1979) two-stage sample selection approach that corrects for possible bias; 
and the Poisson estimator. Santos Silva and Tenreyo (2006) advocate the last of these be used to 
deal with the issue of zeros, on the grounds that the Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood 
(PPML) attains unbiased and consistent estimates of the gravity model. In a follow-up paper, 
they show that the estimator works well even when the proportion of zeros is large (Santos Silva 
and Tenreyo 2011).  
Evaluating the performance of several estimators of the gravity model, Xiong and Cheng 
(2014) find that PPML passes the specification test, in contrast to the Heckman model. They also 
note that the Tobit and Heckman models are subject to potential bias arising from the logarithmic 
transformation. Using a gravity equation similar to model (3), Anderson et al. (2015) estimate 
general equilibrium effects of changes in trade costs, based on a combination of theoretical 
developments (Anderson 1979; Anderson and van Wincoop 2003), the preferred use of PPML to 
deal with the issue of zeros (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006) and the properties of PPML to 
produce consistent estimates in the presence of exporter and importer fixed effects (Fally 2015). 
Accordingly, the gravity model of raw sugar trade determinants is estimated using the Poisson 
estimator with country fixed effects. 
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3. DATA 
The panel dataset consists of bilateral imports of raw sugar into 25 OECD member countries2 
from the rest of the world3 over the period 1961 to 2016. The listed OECD countries include the 
EU member countries, Japan and the United States, all of which feature among the major net 
importers of raw sugar (see Figure 1). 
The data sources are as follows. Raw sugar trade (SITC 0611: sugars, beet and cane, raw, 
solid) in US dollars, are obtained from the International Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS), 
OECD. GDP data (in current US dollars) are from the World Development Indicators (WDI), 
World Bank. Distance, measured in kilometres between the capital cities of the trading partner 
countries, and the dummy variables, are from the CEPII.  
The summary statistics for the data, shown in Table 1, highlight some interesting 
features. First, raw sugar imports are characterised by many zeros and missing observations.4 In 
linear form, the variance for raw sugar imports is much higher than the mean, suggesting the data 
are over-dispersed.5 Second, the measures of spread (the standard deviation about its mean value 
                                                 
2 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, South Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. 
3 The country coverage is based on the 223 partner countries included in the CEPII database. 
4 For the panel dataset of raw sugar imports between 25 OECD countries and 223 partner countries using three-year 
averages over the 1961-2016 period, the number of potential observations is reduced from 105,925 to 9,702 
observations if the dependent variable is in linear form and estimated as a Poisson regression, but is further reduced 
to 8,393 observations if specified in logarithmic form.  
5 Among the family of Poisson estimators, the zero inflated Poisson (ZIP) model helps account for an excessive 
number of zeros while the negative binomial regression (NBREG) uses an extra parameter to model over-dispersion.  
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and the range between the minimum and the maximum values) for the core gravity variables 
(GDP and distance) are indicative of the wide-ranging sample of countries in the dataset.  
 
Table 1  Summary statistics 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum  No. of obs 
Raw sugar import determinants 
Raw sugar imports  5 326 211 2.38e+07 0.00 5.11e+08 9 702 
Raw sugar imports (ln)  10.97 3.83 0.00 20.03 8 393 
GDPi (ln)  25.72 2.02 19.49 30.52 105 925 
GDPj (ln)  22.80 2.54 15.99 30.52 76 306 
Distance (ln) 8.70 0.81 4.09 9.88 105 925 
Adjacency 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 105 925 
Landlocked  0.16  0.37 0.00 1.00 105 925 
Colony: North-North 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 105 925 
Colony: North-South 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 105 925 
North-South colonial channels 
Empire-5  0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 105 925 
Rail lines-to-GDPPC ratio 5.93 22.72 0.25 × 10–2 255.50 24 931 
Ethnic language 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 105 925 
Tariff (ln) 2.55 1.92 0.00 8.07 14 430 
EU–ACP 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 105 925 
EU–EBA 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 105 925 
EU–EPA 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 105 925 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1 Gravity Model Results 
Table 2 presents the results for the gravity model of raw sugar import determinants between 25 
OECD countries and the rest of the world, using three-year averages for the period 1961-2016. 
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The Poisson estimates for the basic model (without price terms)6 are shown in column (1). Time 
and country-specific effects are included in column (2) to account for variation of characteristics  
 
Table 2  Raw sugar import determinants (1961-2016)a 
Regressors Poisson 
+ Time 
+ Country FE 
pre-Reform post-Reform 
GDPi  
0.42** 
(15.43) 
0.34** 
(2.06) 
0.20 
(1.18) 
–0.28 
(–0.36) 
GDPj  
–0.09** 
(–4.50) 
0.19 
(1.54) 
0.18 
(1.54) 
0.61 
(0.95) 
Distance  
0.38** 
(5.92) 
–0.75** 
(–12.57) 
–0.54** 
(–8.52) 
–1.27** 
(–10.49) 
Adjacency 
0.97** 
(3.10) 
1.58** 
(8.19) 
1.70** 
(6.47) 
1.54** 
(7.71) 
Landlocked 
–0.91** 
(–11.08) 
0.49 
(0.56) 
– 
–1.09 
(–1.10) 
Colony: N-N 
–0.76** 
(–2.83) 
–0.69** 
(–2.43) 
–0.42 
(–1.29) 
–1.11** 
(–3.00) 
Colony: N-S 
1.11** 
(12.27) 
1.47** 
(13.35) 
1.75** 
(14.82) 
0.85** 
(3.76) 
No. of obs 8 931 8 931 6 503 2 434 
Pseudo 2R  0.19 0.74 0.77 0.78 
F test for the time and country fixed effects 
Time – 115** 109** 7.91** 
Countryi  – 1 469** 1 870** 545** 
Countryj – 54 812** 6 061** 580 000** 
a The z-statistics in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust.  
** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
across countries.7 Note that the goodness-of-fit ( 2R ) increases substantially when the specific 
effects are admitted into the model, with the independent variables explaining three quarters of 
                                                 
6 Country-specific price terms are not included because of data limitations. For example, the producer price indexes 
for sugar beet and sugar cane from FAOSTAT are available for the years 1992-2015 only. Moreover, including 
these price terms is problematic because some countries have broad-ranging values associated with high inflation – 
and even hyperinflation, for example, Zimbabwe, Brazil, Belarus, Turkey and Venezuela.   
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the variance of the dependent variable. The joint significance of the country fixed effects, as 
indicated by the F  tests, suggests their inclusion in the model is warranted. 
To gain an insight into the changing nature of raw sugar import determinants over time, 
columns (3) and (4) show the sub-period results for the pre-reform (1961-2007) and post-reform 
periods (2008-2016). Indeed, the recent major reform of the EU’s sugar policy is the first of its 
kind since the Common Market Organisation (CMO) was established in 1968 to ensure a fair 
income for sugar producers (via guaranteed minimum support prices) and the availability of 
adequate supplies. In essence, EU sugar policy combined import duties and export refunds to 
protect the internal market while the production quota system served to limit the total quantity 
eligible for price support. Consequently, sugar has received high support when compared even 
with other products covered by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (Nolte et al. 2010). At the 
same time, the EU has imported sugar under various preferential schemes. As part of the 
domestic policy reforms, the unilateral preferences granted by the EU to the ACP countries are 
being replaced with reciprocal (full or interim) regional EPAs that are compatible with World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. 
The results shown in Table 2 suggest the model coefficient signs are broadly in line with 
theoretical priors. Specifically, the core gravity variables (GDP and distance) are correctly signed 
for the preferred model specification (column 2); while omitting the country fixed effects incurs 
an incorrectly signed distance coefficient (column 1). The larger distance coefficient for the post-
                                                                                                                                                             
7 Anderson et al. (2015) suggest the country fixed effects should be time-varying for panel data, but in view of the 
large number of dummies and the failure of the Poisson estimator to converge, time effects are included in the model 
instead. As a robustness check, a least squares regression with time-varying country fixed effects was run; the 
strong, positive and significant coefficient for the North-South colonial dummy remains intact (results available on 
request).  
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reform subsample suggests a rise in transaction costs over time in line with the ‘distance 
puzzle’.8 Although positively signed, the GDP coefficients deviate from their theoretical values 
of unity; Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) have previously pointed out that the economic mass 
coefficients can tend towards zero because GDP is merely a proxy for the production and 
expenditure of tradable goods in the origin and destination countries.    
Adjacent borders significantly increase trade in raw sugar, while the downside of being 
landlocked is wiped out for the preferred specification. More interesting are the distinct effects of 
the North-North and North-South colonial dummies. The negatively signed coefficient for the 
North-North colonial dummy suggests historical colonial ties between the rich countries suppress 
trade in raw sugar. Although insignificant in the pre-reform period, its magnitude and 
significance increases in the post-reform period. In contrast, a strong positive and significant 
effect is found for the North-South colonial dummy, implying the effect of colonial ties endures 
long after many countries have gained independence. The magnitude of its effect, however, 
decreases over time. These results suggest the non-uniform effect of sharing a common colonial 
past depends on the direction of trade, which in turn depends on the source of raw sugar: cane 
from the tropical South or beet from the temperate North. 
4.2 Robustness Checks 
Several robustness tests are undertaken to check the sensitivity of the results for the preferred 
model specification of raw sugar imports. First, to test whether the results are sensitive to the 
                                                 
8 A revolution in world trade, containerisation and the concomitant reduction of shipping costs – and shipping times 
– should lower the distance elasticity over time. The puzzling increase in its elasticity, however, is partly explained 
by the intermodal nature of freight whereby the transfer of cargo from ships to trains and trucks has also involved a 
transfer of operating costs. 
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specification of the model, per capita income levels for both countries are included as additional 
regressors. In identifying separate roles for GDP and per capita GDP, Bergstrand (1989) 
amalgamates the factor-proportions theory (primarily a supply-oriented theory) and the demand-
based theory of similarity of demand characteristics within a Heckscher–Ohlin–Chamberlain–
Linder framework. In essence, the per capita income variables capture factor endowment 
variables in the exporting country (Heckscher 1919; Ohlin 1933) and demand generated by non-
homothetic preferences in the importing country (Linder 1961). Therefore, the coefficients for 
income per capita will be positively signed if the good exchanged is a luxury in consumption, is 
capital-intensive in production and its elasticity of substitution exceeds unity. In contrast, 
negatively signed coefficients accrue if the good exchanged is a necessity in consumption and is 
labour-intensive in production. 
Second, to check whether the world’s largest exporter of raw sugar (see Figure 2) is 
driving the results, the model is re-estimated for a subsample of countries that excludes Brazil, 
following the approach of Emlinger et al. (2008) to drop observations for some geographic areas. 
In fact, Brazil dominates world trade, accounting for 40 per cent of global exports of raw sugar 
in 2014 (ISO 2017). Nevertheless, the flexibility of Brazilian sugar producers to allocate their 
cane yield between sugar and ethanol production can lead to cyclical periods of over- and under-
supply and thus variation of trade (Nolte et al. 2010). The subsample of countries eliminates this 
potential source of uncertainty. 
Third, the model is re-estimated using alternative estimators, namely the ZIP model, 
which helps account for an excessive number of zeros; NBREG, which uses an extra parameter 
to model over-dispersion; and two-stage least squares (2SLS), which is an instrumental variables 
(IV) approach, to control for possible endogeneity arising from reverse causality. The causality 
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between colonial linkages and trade need not necessarily be unidirectional. Former empires may 
have colonised areas where trade linkages were already well-established or where there was 
potential for strong trade linkages between the region and the metropole (Mitchener and 
Weidenmier (2008). As an instrument for empires, they use a lagged value of the size of other 
empires, measured by area. In a similar vein, the instruments used for the North-North and 
North-South colonial dummies are based on land area, whereby the value of unity for the 
respective colonial dummies is replaced with joint land area. Joint land area should serve as a 
good instrument for colonial linkages given that much foreign land was seized under colonial  
Table 3  Robustness checksa,b 
Regressors 
Model 
specification 
Subsample ZIP NBREG 2SLS 
GDPi  
1.43** 
(2.16) 
0.24 
(1.45) 
0.33** 
(2.04) 
0.28* 
(1.70) 
–0.14 
(–0.71) 
GDPj  
0.36 
(1.28) 
0.05 
(0.41) 
0.19 
(1.60) 
0.05 
(0.51) 
–0.07 
(–0.61) 
Distance  
–0.75** 
(–12.56) 
–0.73** 
(–12.03) 
–0.73** 
(–12.01) 
–1.18** 
(–21.17) 
–1.08** 
(–17.64) 
Adjacency 
1.58** 
(8.18) 
1.54** 
(7.77) 
1.52** 
(7.85) 
1.25** 
(9.57) 
1.49** 
(10.08) 
Landlocked 
–0.50 
(–0.31) 
0.69 
(0.75) 
–0.92** 
(–4.77) 
–0.92** 
(–4.77) 
–2.30** 
(–5.89) 
Colony: N-N 
–0.70** 
(–2.56) 
–0.53* 
(–1.89) 
–0.63** 
(–2.20) 
–0.30* 
(–1.76) 
–1.26** 
(–4.80) 
Colony: N-S 
1.47** 
(13.30) 
1.77** 
(13.90) 
1.44** 
(13.06) 
1.25** 
(9.35) 
1.17** 
(3.31) 
GDP per capitai  
–1.09* 
(–1.73) 
– – – – 
GDP per capitaj  
–0.22 
(–0.73) 
– – – – 
No. of obs 8 931 8 666 8 931 8 931 7 683 
2R  0.74 0.75 – – 0.55 
Robust score 2  testc – – – – 26.48** 
Robust regression F-testc – – – – 14.56** 
a All regressions include time and country fixed effects.  
b The z-statistics in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust.  
c A test of the null hypothesis that the colonial dummies are exogenous (Wooldridge 1995). 
** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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rule, implying a direct link between the two.9 The results for the robustness checks are shown in 
Table 3. Although there is some variation in the magnitude and significance of the remaining 
model coefficients, the positive and significant coefficient for the North-South dummy is robust 
across the range of sensitivity checks. 
4.3 North-South Colonial Channels 
Having established a strong positive influence of North-South colonial linkages on raw sugar 
imports, this section analyses the main channels through which the effects of colonial ties have 
endured over time.  
4.3.1 Potential Colonial Channels  
First, the rise of European colonial empires began with the Age of Exploration and the 
pioneering long-distance maritime travel by the Portuguese and the Spanish. Indeed, innovations 
in shipping technology relating to rigging and hull design coupled with knowledge of oceanic 
navigation helped bring about Atlantic trade opportunities, the passage to Asia around the Cape 
of Good Hope and the discovery of the New World (Acemoglu et al. 2005). Other major empires 
included the French, Dutch and British empires, the last becoming the largest in history as 
improved transport technologies brought the global regions of Asia, Africa, the Americas and 
Oceania within its reach. To consider the effect of the five major empires on raw sugar imports, a 
dummy variable, iEMPIRE5 , is set equal to one for France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
                                                 
9 The (simple) correlation between the instruments and the colonial dummies is reasonably high (0.59 and 0.47), 
while the correlation between the instruments and imports is limited (–0.04 and 0.11). 
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the United Kingdom and zero otherwise.10 In seeking to explain the rise of Western Europe, 
Acemoglu et al. (2005) use a similarly defined dummy variable to capture the potential for trade 
via Atlantic routes by the nations most directly involved in trade and colonialism. 
Second, faster steamships paving the way for ocean travel were not the only transport 
technologies to help expand colonial rule abroad. Darwin (2012) notes that shipping and railway 
technologies (and the telegraph) made it possible to expand, police and govern empires with a 
relatively small army and administration. Rail networks – critical to the Industrial Revolution 
and the development of export economies – remain an important mode of land transport. 
Consequently, total railway routes measured in kilometres and scaled by GDP per capita, tjRAIL , 
sourced from the WDI, World Bank, is used to assess the effect of a country’s internal transport 
network on raw sugar trade. Raballand (2003) employs a similarly scaled measure of 
infrastructure to take account of the difference between large and small countries. 
Third, commerce and colonisation spread European languages to indigenous populations. 
Based on the principles of mercantilism and imperial preference, merchants had a strong 
financial incentive to learn the language of colonists in order to sell more goods (Mitchener and 
Weidenmier 2008). Speaking the colonial language along with familiarity of foreign customs and 
norms can help lower transaction costs and payment frictions associated with trade. For example, 
social networks and informal relationships can encourage deals where laws of contract are weak 
which, in turn, help foster trade. Even if the main language spoken by the population differed 
                                                 
10 Only the major empires engaged in substantial Atlantic trade and colonial activity are considered. Smaller empires 
(such as those of Germany and the United States) did not play a major role in long-distance oceanic trade. 
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from that of the imperial power,11 a lingua franca often sprung up around commercial centres 
(Mitchener and Weidenmier 2008). Accordingly, a common ethnic language dummy, ijLANG , 
sourced from the CEPII, is used to analyse the trade effect of cultural proximity. Francois and 
Manchin (2013) also use this measure as a proxy for linguistic or cultural heritage. 
Last, trade policy can also act as a channel through which North-South colonial ties can 
affect trade in sugar. Sugar is one of the most policy-distorted of all commodities and among the 
worst offenders are the EU, Japan and the United States where producer prices are supported at 
levels much higher than international prices (Mitchell 2004; Elobeid and Beghin 2006). With a 
combination of production quotas, import controls and export subsidies, support has been 
greatest in the EU (Mitchell 2004). In the United States, domestic prices are supported at about 
double world prices, quotas are in place to limit production, and tariff rate quotas (TRQs) limit 
imports. In Japan, government intervention in the sugar market takes the form of guaranteed 
minimum prices for sugar beet and cane, controls on raw sugar imports, prohibitive duties on 
refined sugar imports, high tariffs on imported products containing sugar, as well as quotas, 
tariffs and other controls on sugar substitutes. As a measure of sugar protection, tariffs levied on 
the product category 1701 (cane or beet, solid), is sourced from the Trade Analysis Information 
System (TRAINS), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
defined as the log of the (simple average) tariff, )1ln( tij , in line with others in the empirical 
literature (Cipollina and Salvatici 2010; Francois and Manchin 2013). 
The flipside of protectionism is preferential treatment. Colonies may well have provided 
an avenue for European powers to set up preferential trading arrangements (Estevadeordal et al. 
                                                 
11 The incentive to learn the language of the colonists was counterbalanced by the self-serving interests of the 
Europeans to respect local customs and laws – including the institution of slavery.  
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2003). Policies adopted by Imperial powers included: tariff assimilation, which in effect created 
a customs union between the metropole and the colony; preferential tariff policies with lower or 
zero tariffs applied on imports from the colony; and ‘open door’ policies where, instead of 
differential policies at the border, levies were often used to protect local industries or to raise 
revenue for the fiscal authority (Mitchener and Weidenmier 2008). Imperial preferences under 
the British Commonwealth Preference Scheme (1932) were granted on the basis of ‘home 
producers first, empire producers second and foreign producers last’.  
For sugar in particular, under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) the United 
Kingdom guaranteed to purchase specified quantities of sugar from the Commonwealth countries 
for a price higher than the market price. With its accession into the European Community (EC) 
in 1973, this preferential agreement was replaced with the Sugar Protocol attached to the Lomé 
Convention, under which specified import quotas of cane sugar at the same guaranteed prices as 
EC producers (about three times the world market price) were allocated primarily to a subset of 
the ACP countries (Garside et al. 2005).12 
The non-reciprocal preferential treatment of the ACP countries under the Sugar Protocol 
was largely retained in the later Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement. Specifically, 
the import quantities of sugar specified under the Lomé Convention, known as ‘preference sugar’ 
were expanded in 1995 (‘special preference sugar’), but at a lower price and a quantity that 
                                                 
12 The origin of trade preferences for the ACP countries goes back to the Treaty of Rome signed in 1957, which 
expressed a commitment to the prosperity of European (mostly French) colonies. After gaining independence, 
reciprocal preferences between six European countries and 19 (mostly African) former colonies were enshrined in 
the Yaoundé Conventions signed in 1963 and 1969 (Persson 2008). To accommodate the preferences of British 
former colonies, Yaoundé was replaced with the Lomé Convention and European-African co-operation was 
expanded to the Caribbean and Pacific countries – 46 developing countries in all. 
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varied according to import needs (Mitchell 2004). Import allocations were also granted to India 
and were expanded to several developing countries in 2001 under the EBA initiative while 
several Balkan countries also received temporary access to the EU market (Mitchell 2004). 
Pressures to reform the preferential sugar regime – leading to the phasing out of the 
Sugar Protocol – arose from three distinct sources (Ackrill and Kay 2011). First, duty free and 
quota free (DFQF) imports from the developing countries under the EBA initiative would 
undermine the preferential treatment offered to ACP countries under the Sugar Protocol. Second, 
a WTO ruling required the EU to substantially reduce its volumes of subsidised sugar exports. 
Finally, maintaining a protectionist sugar regime became increasingly difficult in the face of 
ongoing CAP reforms undertaken since 1992 to cut support prices. 
During the transition period to phase out the Sugar Protocol, guaranteed prices are to 
decrease and eventually be abolished; quotas are to come to an end; and imports from the ACP 
countries are to become DFQF under seven regional EPAs. In essence, the EPAs are trade and 
development partnerships between the EU and ACP countries, with the main aims of providing 
tariff and quota free access to the EU market (for all goods, not just for sugar); fostering trade-
related co-operation; and promoting sustainable development through investment. A summary of 
the EU–ACP PTAs and EPAs is provided in the Appendix (Table A3). 
Preferential treatment is most often captured by a dummy variable denoting the formation 
of a particular trade agreement (Zahniser et al. 2002; Baier and Bergstrand 2007; Grant and 
Lambert 2008). Three dummies – one covering the pre-reform period and two covering the post-
reform period – are constructed to capture the potential beneficial effects of EU preferential 
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market access on raw sugar trade.13 First, the tijACPEU   dummy is defined as unity for the 19 
ACP Sugar Protocol countries under the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement over 
the pre-reform period 1976-2007.14 Second, the tijEBAEU   dummy takes the value of unity 
from 2009 onwards – the date from which imports for any country classified as a developing 
country became DFQF.15 Third, the tijEPAEU   dummy takes the value of one if an ACP 
country has entered into a full or interim EPA.16 In short, to allow for the main channels through 
which North-South colonial ties can affect trade in raw sugar, the gravity model variables are 
summarised as follows:   
 
                                                 
13 Note that the dataset based on 25 OECD countries accounts for the 15 established member countries of the EU 
only. Over time, the European Economic Community (EEC), with its six founding members (Belgium, France, 
(West) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands), was expanded by four rounds of enlargement when 
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined in 1973; Greece in 1981; Portugal and Spain in 1986; and Austria, 
Finland and Sweden in 1995. The dataset does not account for the three most recent rounds of enlargement, which 
increased the number of EU member countries to 28. 
14 The 19 ACP Sugar Protocol countries are Barbados, Belize, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Fiji, Guyana, Jamaica, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname, Swaziland, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
15 Currently, 47 countries qualify for EBA status: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, East Timor, Guinea, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia 
(United Nations, 2017).  
16 The EPA dummy is based on information in the Appendix (Table A3). 
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4.3.2 Colonial Channel Estimates 
Table 4 presents the gravity model results which include the North-South colonial channels. For 
ease of comparison, the baseline specification (without colonial channels) is shown in column 
(1). Columns (2) to (6) show the independent effects of the various channels on raw sugar 
imports. Column (7) shows the results when all the colonial channels are simultaneously 
included in the model.  
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Table 4  Raw sugar import determinants and North-South colonial channelsa,b 
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Raw sugar import determinants        
GDPi  
0.34** 
(2.06) 
0.34** 
(2.06) 
0.61* 
(1.88) 
0.34** 
(2.09) 
0.80** 
(2.21) 
0.35** 
(2.15) 
0.79** 
(1.98) 
GDPj  
0.19 
(1.54) 
0.19 
(1.54) 
0.46* 
(1.78) 
0.19 
(1.57) 
0.23 
(1.18) 
0.21* 
(1.67) 
0.38 
(1.12) 
Distance  
–0.75** 
(–12.57) 
–0.75** 
(–12.57) 
–1.31** 
(–12.59) 
–0.74** 
(–12.25) 
–0.90** 
(–10.15) 
–0.80** 
(–13.01) 
–1.41** 
(–8.18) 
Adjacency 
1.58** 
(8.19) 
1.58** 
(8.19) 
1.27** 
(5.89) 
1.55** 
(8.00) 
2.23** 
(4.34) 
1.49** 
(7.80) 
1.35** 
(2.54) 
Landlocked  
0.49 
(0.56) 
0.49 
(0.56) 
2.59** 
(4.07) 
0.47 
(0.53) 
0.28 
(0.34) 
–0.16 
(–0.18) 
1.33** 
(2.00) 
Colony: N-N 
–0.69** 
(–2.43) 
–0.69** 
(–2.43) 
–0.71** 
(–2.71) 
–0.76** 
(–2.60) 
–3.44** 
(–7.88) 
–0.56** 
(–2.00) 
–2.08** 
(–3.02) 
Colony: N-S 
1.47** 
(13.35) 
1.47** 
(13.35) 
0.87** 
(3.26) 
1.39** 
(10.18) 
1.50** 
(10.18) 
1.33** 
(11.02) 
0.46 
(0.84) 
North-South colonial channels        
Empire-5  – 
2.10** 
(5.53) 
– – – – 
1.95** 
(2.50) 
Rail lines    – – 
0.01** 
(3.58) 
– – – 
0.01** 
(3.51) 
Ethnic language  – – – 
0.11 
(0.99) 
– – 
0.76** 
(3.49) 
Tariff – – – – 
–0.10** 
(–2.78) 
– 
–0.06 
(–1.22) 
EU-ACP – – – – – 
1.18** 
(7.18) 
1.44** 
(5.62) 
EU-EBA – – – – – 
1.05** 
(4.68) 
0.46 
(1.31) 
EU-EPA – – – – – 
0.27 
(1.12) 
– 
No. of obs 8 931 8 931 5 426 8 931 4 917 8 931 3 136 
Pseudo 2R  0.74 0.74 0.82 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.85 
a All regressions include time and country fixed effects.  
b The z-statistics in parentheses are heteroscedasticity robust.  
** denotes significance at the 5% level; * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
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The existence of former major European empires exerts a strong positive effect on sugar 
trade, as shown in Column (2).17 Long after the empires have dissolved, their transatlantic 
trading routes remain in place with consequential effects on the volumes of sugar traded. In other 
words, trading routes have helped maintain a degree of economic dependence, despite political 
independence. This result is consistent with Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008), who find empire 
membership more than doubles bilateral trade in a historical context.   
Although small in magnitude, rail lines are also found to be beneficial for the import of 
raw sugar (column 3). A good network of rail connectivity is essential to transport many bulky 
agricultural goods overland, including raw sugar, consistent with the findings in the literature 
(Donaldson 2010; Mitchener and Weidenmier 2008). 
Trade in raw sugar is found to be unresponsive to a common ethnic language (column 4); 
having acclimatised to local customs and habits over time, the associated lower transaction costs 
no longer have an effect.18 In analysing economic performance, Acemoglu et al. (2005) obtain 
                                                 
17 Re-estimating the model with individual dummies for the five major empires, the results suggest a positive and 
significant trade effect for all empires except the Dutch empire. In terms of the magnitude of effects, the British 
empire coefficient is found to be highest, reflecting its maritime might, followed by that of Portugal, Spain and 
France. The non-uniform effects across the empires reflect differing levels and durations of engagement in colonial 
sugar production and trade, but may also accrue from differing trade policies or varying transaction costs (Mitchener 
and Weidenmier 2008).  
18 Language is defined as a country’s ethnic language spoken by at least 9 per cent of a country’s population. Testing 
for the effect of the official or national language yields a negative and significant result. This counter-intuitive result 
is at least partly explained by the trade protectionist policies of the former colonial powers. Indeed, many English-
speaking Caribbean producers that were offered high guaranteed prices under the Sugar Protocol have persevered 
with outdated practices (such as harvesting by hand), thereby making it difficult to compete with the mechanised 
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similar findings in so far as the rise of Europe is attributed to profits involved in Atlantic trade 
and colonialism, while distinctive European characteristics including culture and religion are 
relegated to insignificance. 
Not surprisingly, tariffs reduce bilateral trade in raw sugar (column 5). Since Europeans 
first established domestic sugar industries in the early 1800s – encouraged by subsidising higher-
cost sugar beet production in reaction to rebellion and disrupted supplies in the colonies – a long 
tradition of protectionism has characterised the sugar industry.19 Indeed, the clash between sugar 
beet and sugar cane has remained a centrepiece of sugar policy in Europe (Mitchell 2004). In 
effect, Northern countries have protected their domestic producers from cheap imports, even 
though many are net sugar importers. 
At the same time the sugar industry is also defined by preferential market access (Garside 
et al. 2005). Indeed, in the presence of domestic import protection, preferential market access for 
raw sugar has been presented as a development policy (Ackrill and Kay, 2011). Representing one 
of the longest standing and highest preference margin granting agreements (Williams and Ruffer 
2003), the EU-ACP Sugar Protocol is found to raise trade significantly and substantially (column 
6). A similarly high trade effect is obtained for the EUs EBA initiative, reflecting the large 
number of beneficiaries under this scheme, including former beneficiaries under the Sugar 
Protocol. The recent formation (and ongoing negotiation) of regional EPAs has yet to have an 
                                                                                                                                                             
sugar operations of Brazil and Australia. Faced with high average costs and low productivity, the consequence is 
borne out in shrinking exports of raw sugar. 
19 In Northern countries, the sugar industry has become highly politicised with concomitant arguments for 
protectionist trade policies. Under the CAP, for example, sugar is the only sector that receives predictable terms for 
delivering and buying beet without competition scrutiny, implying EU beet growers are more protected than any 
other farmers (European Commission, 2016). 
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effect on the imports of raw sugar trade. Take, for example, the CARIFORUM EPA with 15 
Caribbean countries and territories. Apart from Belize, where sugar provides a quarter of export 
earnings, the decline of sugar in the region is rife. Some have closed down their last sugar 
factories, abandoning cane in favour of more profitable activities (Saint Kitts and Nevis; 
Trinidad and Tobago) while elsewhere the sugar industry is under pressure as losses mount up, 
workers are laid off and exports dwindle (Barbados, Guyana and Jamaica). This process has been 
driven strongly by the extent of the EU sugar policy reform, notably the abandonment of high 
prices paid for preferential sugar, replaced by DFQF market access but at much lower prices. 
Putting all the colonial channels together, the results for the full model are shown in 
column (7) in Table 4. In terms of the trade policy variables, Scoppola et al. (2018) have 
previously included tariffs and PTA dummies in a trade model of agricultural and food products. 
Accordingly, tariffs should reduce trade while the effect of PTAs is indeterminate, depending on 
whether the associated lowering of non-tariff barriers is outweighed by the cost of compliance 
with the preferential scheme, for example through additional costs associated with rules of 
origin. 
When all colonial channels are included in the model, the most notable change in the 
results is that the North-South colonial dummy becomes insignificant. In other words, the legacy 
of colonial ties between the old and new worlds is picked up by the combined effects of the 
various channels in the full model. Some of the channels also become insignificant in the full 
model, namely tariffs and the EU-EBA dummy, likely reflecting the phasing out of tariffs on 
sugar for countries that qualify for EBA status, becoming zero after 2009. In contrast, the effect 
of a common minority language becomes significant.20 
                                                 
20 Testing for the effect of national language in the full model, its coefficient remains negative and significant. 
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The inclusion of the various channels in the model also has consequences for the 
remaining model coefficients, mainly in relation to an increased magnitude of effect (importer 
GDP, distance, landlocked and the North-North colonial dummy). In addition, the geographic 
disadvantage of landlocked countries becomes a significant advantage when connected by 
railways (columns 3 and 7). Note that the inclusion of all channels in the model reduces the 
number of observations (data for railway routes are available from 1980 onwards, while tariff 
information is available for 1988-2014). Therefore, the model coefficients are not directly 
comparable across the different sample periods. 
4.3.3 Counterfactual Predictions 
So far, the statistical significance of North-South colonial linkages has been established. It is also 
useful to consider the economic significance of the results. In other words, what is the 
counterfactual change in the dependent variable if the value for each colonial channel is 
hypothetically altered? A typical counterfactual comparative static exercise using the gravity 
model involves hypothetically changing some bilateral friction (for example, the removal of a 
tariff) and calculating the effects on trade flows (Anderson et al. 2015).  
Taking each colonial channel in turn, the percentage change in the mean of the dependent 
variable is calculated under the following scenarios: (1) if the five major European empires had 
never existed; (2) if rail lines in partner countries had increased by 100 per cent; (3) if countries 
had not shared the same minority language; (4) if raw sugar trade had been liberalised; and (5) if 
PTAs had been eliminated. In essence, this amounts to resetting tariffs and the dummy variables 
(empire5, language and PTAs) to zero while the value of rail lines is doubled in view of the time 
and money spent on infrastructure planning. 
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A comparison of the means of the dependent variable, shown in Table 5, suggests the 
greatest effect on raw sugar imports emanates from empires, without which the imports of raw 
sugar would be up to one-third lower. The effect of eliminating PTAs is more modest, reducing 
raw sugar trade by one-tenth. Expanding a country’s internal transport network of railways 
would increase raw sugar trade by up to one-tenth. The trade effect of no common language is 
relatively minor while the effect of removing tariffs is negligible. 
 
Table 5  Counterfactual predictions 
 Empire-5 Rail lines    
Ethnic  
language 
Tariff  EU PTAs 
Counterfactual change in the mean of the dependent variable (US$ million) 
Predicted value 1.84 1.82 1.83 2.99 1.79 
Predicted counterfactual value 1.34 1.96 1.76 3.00 1.63 
Percentage change –27% 7.71% –3.76% 0.58% –9.14% 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Using a gravity model for a panel of bilateral imports of raw sugar into 25 OECD countries from 
the rest of the world over the 1961-2016 period, the effect of historical colonial linkages on sugar 
trade is assessed. In distinguishing between the geographical types of the colonial partner, 
opposing coefficient signs for the colonial dummies are found: positive in a North-South 
direction and negative in a North-North direction. These results suggest the legacy of a common 
colonial past depends on the type of sugar traded and the climatic location of the ex-colony, with 
raw sugar coming either from lower-cost sugar cane grown mainly in tropical regions or higher-
cost sugar beet grown in more temperate climates.  
Multiple channels through which North-South colonial linkages continue to affect trade 
are also identified. First, transatlantic and long-distance maritime connections contribute 
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positively to the global patterns of raw sugar imports, reflecting trading routes first opened up 
during the Empire era. A good network of rail connectivity is also essential to transport bulky 
agricultural goods like sugar. Taken together, these findings suggest that further infrastructure 
developments such as improved port efficiency and an extended internal transport network – and 
indeed facilitating intermodal transport linkages that connect ports with overland transport 
systems through containerisation – can help enhance the trade benefits of historical colonial 
linkages for Southern countries. 
Second, the spread of commerce and colonisation also dispersed European languages and 
cultures. The effect on raw sugar imports, however, depends on whether the common language is 
spoken by a minority or majority of a country’s population – the effect turning negative for a 
common national language, likely reflecting the protectionist trade policies of the former 
colonial powers. 
Third, despite a long tradition of protectionism in the sugar industry, protectionist trade 
policy in the form of tariffs is not a significant barrier to the import of raw sugar in the full 
model, in tandem with the phasing out of tariffs on sugar for countries that qualify for EBA 
status, becoming zero after 2009.  
Last, EU preferential market access granted to 19 ACP Sugar Protocol countries over the 
pre-reform period covering the Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement is found to raise 
trade significantly and substantially. In other words, EU policy initiated in 1975 offering 
selective, non-reciprocal trade preferences to former colonies have helped maintain historical 
trade flows in sugar. For the post-reform period, an insignificant trade effect is obtained for 
developing countries that qualify under the EBA initiative while the recent formation (and 
ongoing negotiation) of regional EPAs has yet to have an effect on raw sugar trade. In short, 
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long-standing historical linkages between Europe and its former colonies continue to exert a 
strong influence on the policies and patterns of sugar trade along well-worn paths. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1  Colonial listing 
 Coloniser Colonised 
   
North-North direction Austria Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovenia 
    Denmark Iceland 
    France Canada, United States  
    Germany Poland 
    Greece Cyprus, Turkey 
    Japan South Korea 
    Netherlands Luxembourg 
    Spain United States 
    Sweden Estonia, Finland 
   
 Turkey 
Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Macedonia FYR, 
Serbia and Montenegro 
   
 United Kingdom 
Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, Malta, New Zealand, United 
States 
   North-South direction Australia Christmas Island, Cocos Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea 
    Belgium Burundi, DR Congo, Rwanda 
    Denmark Faroe Islands, Greenland 
   
 France 
Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Gabon, French 
Guiana, Guadeloupe, Guinea, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, 
Martinique, Mauritania, Morocco, New Caledonia, Niger, French Polynesia, Réunion, 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Senegal, Seychelles, Syria, Togo, Tunisia, Vanuatu, 
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Vietnam, Wallis and Futuna Islands    
   
 Germany 
Burundi, Micronesia, Namibia, Nauru, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa    
    Italy Libya, Somalia 
    Japan Korea DPR, Micronesia, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Taiwan  
    Netherlands Aruba, Netherlands Antilles, Indonesia, South Africa, Suriname 
    New Zealand Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, Tokelau 
   
 Portugal 
Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, Macau, Mozambique, São 
Tomé and Príncipe 
   
 Spain  
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Falkland Islands, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Micronesia, 
Nicaragua, Northern Mariana Islands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Puerto 
Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela, Western Sahara     
    Turkey Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen   
   
 United Kingdom 
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belize, Bermuda, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cayman Islands, Christmas Island, 
Cocos Islands, Cook Islands, Dominica, Egypt, Eritrea, Falkland Islands, Fiji, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guyana, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, 
Kuwait, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Montserrat, Myanmar, 
Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Pakistan, Palau, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Island, 
Qatar, Saint Helena, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tanzania, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Turks and Caicos Islands, 
Uganda, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, British 
Virgin Islands, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
    United States Micronesia, Northern Mariana Islands, Philippines, Palau, Puerto Rico 
Note: Data are sourced from CEPII (2017). 
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Table A2  Model variables defined and data sources  
Variable Description  Source 
Raw sugar import determinants 
t
ijIMPORTS   
OECD imports of raw sugar trade, in 
US dollars, from the rest of the world.  
International Trade by Commodity 
Statistics (ITCS), OECD. 
     
t
iGDPln  
The log of GDP for the OECD 
countries (OECD-25).  
World Development Indicators 
(WDI), World Bank. 
     
t
jGDPln  
The log of GDP for the rest of the 
world (ROW-223).  
World Development Indicators 
(WDI), World Bank. 
     ijDISTln  
The log of the great circle distance, in 
kilometres, between two capital cities. 
CEPII. 
ijADJ  
A dummy variable equal to unity if 
both countries share an adjacent border. 
CEPII. 
jLOCK  
A dummy variable equal to unity if 
countryj is a landlocked country. 
CEPII.  
ijCOLNN  
A dummy variable equal to unity if 
both countries share a common colonial 
past in a North-North direction.  
CEPII. 
ijCOLNS  
A dummy variable equal to unity if 
both countries share a common colonial 
past in a North-South direction.  
CEPII. 
North-South colonial channels 
iEMPIRE5  
A dummy variable equal to unity 
denoting five major empires 
(France, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and the United Kingdom). 
Acemoglu et al. (2005). 
t
jRAIL  
Total railway routes, in 
kilometres, as a ratio of GDP per capita.  
World Development Indicators 
(WDI), World Bank. 
ijLANG  
A dummy variable equal to unity if 
both countries share a common ethnic 
language.  
CEPII. 
t
ijTARIFFln    
The log of tariffs, )1( tij , defined as the 
(simple average) tariff levied on the  product 
category 1701 (cane or beet, solid).  
Trade Analysis Information System 
(TRAINS), UNCTAD.  
t
ijACPEU   
 
A dummy variable equal to unity 
denoting preferential treatment for  
the 19 ACP Sugar Protocol countries. 
European Commission and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
t
ijEBAEU   
 
A dummy variable equal to unity 
denoting developing countries included 
in the Everything But Arms initiative. 
European Commission and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
t
ijEPAEU   
 
A dummy variable equal to unity 
denoting membership of a full or 
interim economic partnership agreement.   
European Commission and the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
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Table A3  Summary of EU–ACP preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) 
Agreement 
Date of 
signature 
Date of entry 
into force 
Countries  
Yaoundé I  20 July 1963 1 June 1964 
The Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) comprising 18 
African ex-colonies: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia and Togo. 
    
Yaoundé II 29 July 1969 1 Jan 1971 A partnership with 19 African states (AASM and Mauritius).  
    
Lomé I  28 Feb 1975 1 April 1976 
Co-operation between 46 developing African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries consisting of 19 African states (AASM and Mauritius) and 27 
additional countries: The Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, 
Ethiopia, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, 
Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Samoa, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda and 
Zambia.  
    
Lomé II  31 Oct 1979 1 Jan 1981 
Twelve additional countries (Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, 
Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, 
Solomon Islands, Suriname and Tuvalu) bring the total number of ACP 
countries to 58.  
    
Lomé III  8 Dec 1984 1 March 1985 
The total number of ACP countries increases to 66 with the addition of eight 
more countries: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Mozambique, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.  
    
Lomé IV  15 Dec 1989 1 March 1990 
ACP membership increases to 69 as three more countries join: the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti and Namibia. For the revised Lomé IV Convention, the 
accession of Eritrea brings the total number of ACP countries to 70. 
    
Cotonou1 23 June 2000 1 April 2003 
Negotiating with nine additional countries (Cook Islands, Cuba, East Timor, 
Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, South Africa), the Cotonou 
Agreement with 79 countries replaces the Lomé Conventions.  
    
CARIFORUM2 15 Oct 2008 1 Nov 2008 
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint 
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Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago. 
    Southern African  
   Development  
   Community3  
10 June 2016 10 Oct 2016 Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. 
    
West Africa4  – – 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone and Togo. 
    East African  
   Community5  
– – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 
    Eastern and 
Southern    
   Africa6 
– – 
Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.  
    Central Africa7 
 
– – 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, DR Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe. 
    
Pacific8 – – 
Cook Islands, East Timor, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, 
Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu.  
Note: Based on information from the European Commission (2017) and the World Trade Organisation (2017).  
1 Although not a signatory, Cuba was included in the ACP-EU partnership. East Timor became the last member after gaining independence. 
2 Ratification by Haiti is still pending.   
3 Mozambique ratified the agreement on 28 April 2017, which will enter into provisional application after being submitted to the Council. Angola has the option  
  to join the agreement in the future.  
4 The EU initialled an EPA with the West African states on 30 June 2014. The signature process is ongoing. Côte d'Ivoire signed an interim EPA on 26  
  November 2008, which entered into provisional application on 3 September 2016. Ghana signed an interim EPA on 28 July 2016, which entered into  
  provisional application on 15 December 2016. 
5 The EU initialled an EPA with the Eastern African Community (EAC) on 16 October 2014.  
6 The EU is currently negotiating an EPA with the Eastern and Southern African (ESA) countries. Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Zimbabwe signed an  
  interim EPA on 29 August 2009,  which entered into provisional application on 14 May 2012.  
7 The EU is currently negotiating an EPA with the Central African countries. Cameroon signed an interim EPA on 15 January 2009, which entered into  
  provisional application on 4 August 2014. 
8 The EU is currently negotiating an EPA with 14 Pacific countries. Fiji and Papua New Guinea signed an interim EPA on 30 July 2009 and 11 December 2009 
respectively, which entered into provisional application on 20 December 2009 for Papua New Guinea and 28 July 2014 for Fiji.  
 
